

AN13501

EdgeLock A5000 for secure connection to OEM cloud

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Application note

Document information

Information	Content
Keywords	A5000, Secure cloud onboarding
Abstract	This document describes how to leverage A5000 to establish a secure connection with the private cloud of an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).



Revision history

Revision history

Revision number	Date	Description
1.0	2021-03-28	Initial version

1 Device-to-cloud authentication

Security is a major aspect to take into account when deploying and managing IoT devices that connect to the cloud. As the number of connected devices grows, the higher the risk of confidential, sensitive or critical data leakage. Without security, any rogue user can sniff the communication and disclose private data.

With the expansion of IoT solutions, the number of devices that need to authenticate and send data to clouds grows exponentially. This is the case for industrial devices, sensor networks, IP cameras, smart home devices, home gateways, and smart cities. In these type of applications:

- The IoT device needs to authenticate the cloud that will be connected to.
- The cloud also needs to authenticate the IoT devices to trust them.

Therefore, to avoid rogue devices or data being compromised, it is essential to authenticate devices and clouds as well as protecting the data exchanged between an IoT device and the cloud.

TLS is one of the most used protocols to secure Internet connections, including the communication of IoT devices with the cloud. The A5000 supports TLS protocol using pre-shared secrets and provides a tamper-resistant platform to securely store keys and credentials needed for cloud authentication. [Figure 1](#) depicts the device-to-cloud authentication scenario using TLS protocol and A5000.




Figure 1. Device-to-cloud authentication scenario

The exchange of digital certificates is the basis of the authentication process during the TLS handshake protocol. The two parties check that the certificate is valid and was issued by a trusted authority, called Certificate Authority. [Section 2](#) describes how certificates are verified using a chain of trust.

In addition, the TLS handshake protocol uses asymmetric encryption to generate a shared secret key that enables the encryption of the data exchange between two parties. [Section 3](#) describes how to leverage A5000 to conduct the TLS handshake protocol.


2 Certificate chain of trust

IoT requires each device to possess a unique identity. For certificate-based authentication scheme, the identity is made of:


- Device certificate
- Device key pair

The digital certificate binds an identity with a public key. Digital certificates are verified using a chain of trust. The certificate chain of trust is a structure of certificates that enables the receiver to verify that the sender and all CA's are trustworthy. The trust anchor for the digital certificate is the root CA.


Certificates are issued and signed by certificates that reside higher in the certificate hierarchy, so the validity and trustworthiness of a given certificate is determined by the corresponding validity of the certificate that signed it. The certificate chain of trust results in a root CA signing an intermediate CA that in turn signs a leaf certificate as shown in [Figure 2](#):



IoT devices manufactured by the OEM should be equipped with a unique key pair and a digital certificate signed by the OEM's CA certificate. The OEM's CA certificate is used to sign all the certificates of the devices manufactured by the OEM as shown in [Figure 3](#). Precisely, this signature provides the means to verify the validity of device certificates in the field.



Before an IoT device manufactured by the OEM goes to the operation phase, they must possess the CA certificate, a device certificate and a key pair securely stored. Similarly, the OEM cloud platform must possess a certificated signed by the CA and its related private key as shown in [Figure 4](#).



Security ICs chips like A5000 are capable of internally protecting private keys in IoT devices. The CA certificate is typically stored outside the A5000. [Section 4](#) outlines the A5000 trust provisioning models available.

3 TLS handshake

TLS is an industry standard designed to provide identification, authentication, confidentiality and integrity of the communication between two endpoints. Every TLS connection begins with a *TLS handshake* protocol that manages the cipher suite negotiation, the client and server authentication and the session key exchange. It consists of:

- The *hello* phase, where both parties negotiate the protocol version and cipher suite.
- The *client* and *server* key exchange phase.
- The session *secret key calculation* phase, where a pre-master secret and exchanged random values are used to calculate a session key that will be used for securing communication.

Figure 5 illustrates the phases involved in a TLS handshake negotiation:




Figure 5. TLS handshake steps

This section briefly explains the use of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement in a TLS handshake and the use of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) as an authentication mechanism. For more information, please refer to the RFC4492 [1].

3.1 Hello phase

The TLS handshake begins by sending a *client_hello* message. The *client_hello* message is sent by the IoT device and includes its supported *cipher suites*. It comprises three distinct algorithms:

- The *key exchange and authentication algorithm* used during the handshake (e.g. TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256).
- The *encryption algorithm* used to encipher data (e.g. TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256).
- The *MAC algorithm* used to generate the message digest (e.g. TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256).

In addition, the *client_hello* message also includes a random number. This random number must be requested to the A5000 security IC.

The server responds with a *server_hello* message, which contains the cipher suite chosen, the session ID and another random number. Figure 6 illustrates the TLS handshake *hello* phase.





Figure 6. TLS handshake - Hello phase

3.2 Server key exchange phase

For the key exchange from the server side, the server sends:

- A `server_certificate` message, which is capable of carrying the whole server certificate chain (leaf certificate and CA certificate).
- A `serverKeyExchange` message, which contains the ephemeral ECDH public key and a specification of the corresponding curve. These parameters are signed with ECDSA using the private key corresponding to the public key in the server's certificate.
- A `client_certificate_request` message, which makes client authentication mandatory. This option is recommended to avoid unauthorized devices to connect to the IoT network.

The IoT device verifies the validity of the server certificate chain and then uses the public key in the server's certificate to verify the ECDSA signature of the parameters received in the `serverKeyExchange` message. A5000 can optionally be leveraged for verifying the ECDSA signature. A valid signature proves the server identity as shown in [Figure 7](#).




3.3 Client key exchange phase

For the key exchange from the client side, the IoT device sends:

- A *client_certificate* message, which is capable of carrying the whole client certificate chain (leaf certificate and CA certificate).
- A *proof of possession* message, which includes a signature used to prove that the IoT device is in possession of the private key. The signature is performed in A5000 using the IoT device private key.
- A *client_key_exchange* message, which includes a ECDH key public generated on the same curve as the server's ephemeral ECDH key. The ECDHE ephemeral keys are typically generated in the IoT device MCU.

The server verifies the IoT device certificate chain and uses the IoT device public key in the client certificate to verify the proof of possession. By performing this operation, the server verifies that the IoT device is actually in possession of the private key corresponding to the public key in the client certificate. The process is shown in [Figure 8](#).




3.4 Secret key calculation phase

Both client and server perform an ECDH operation. The result is used as input to compute the premaster secret. The A5000 is in charge of calculating both the premaster and master secrets. The master secret is calculated using:

- The pre-master secret
- The client and server random numbers
- An identifier label

The process is shown in [Figure 9](#).



At this point, both the IoT device and the OEM cloud are in possession of the shared secret key and can start to securely exchange data using a symmetric cryptographic algorithm.

4 A5000 secure provisioning

The IoT device identity should be unique, verifiable and trustworthy so that device registration attempts and any data uploaded to the OEM's servers can be trusted.

The A5000 is designed to provide a tamper-resistant platform to safely store keys and credentials needed for device authentication and registration to OEM's cloud service. Leveraging the A5000 security IC, OEMs can safely authenticate their devices without writing security code or exposing credentials or keys.

You can rely on any of the secure provisioning options for the A5000 security IC:

- **A5000 pre-configuration for ease of use:** Every A5000 product variant comes pre-provisioned with keys which can be used for all major use cases, including secure onboarding to clouds.
- **A5000 secure provisioning by NXP:** The NXP Trust Provisioning service offers customized and secure injection of die-individual keys and credentials into A5000 on behalf of the OEM. This service is available for high volume orders of more than 150K units.
- **A5000 secure provisioning by NXP distributors or third-party partners:** NXP has agreements with distributors and third-party partners to offer customized and secure injection of die-individual keys and credentials into A5000 for orders of any size.

Note: A5000 provisioning can optionally be done by the OEM in case it owns or invests in PKI infrastructure at their facilities.

5 References

- [1] RFC4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) - available in the web [here](#).

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